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counsel might be allowed him, and cited the preamble of
the statute as declaring that such a demand was reason-
able and just. Lord Holt, one of the greatest of English
judges, and of the best of men, replied: " God forbid that
we should anticipate the operation of an Act of Parliament
even by a single day." The prisoner then asked that the
trial be postponed, but his application was refused, and the
unlucky man was actually convicted and executed six
hours before the bill went into effect.'
It was a long time, however, before counsel were
bold enough to defend their clients with spirit, and it re-
mained for Dunning and the never-to-be-daunted Erskine to
establish the rights of the Bar ; while it was not until 1836
-though we in this country had enjoyed the right from
early colonial days-that prisoners in England, indidted
for felony, could command the assistance of counsel. In
cases of misdemeanor and in civil actions the right to coun-
sel had always existed without dispute.
THE PENNSYLVANIA DEFEASANCE ACT OF
JUNE 8, 1881, AND THE CASE OF SANKEY
v. HAWLEY.
BY C. STUART PATTERSON, ESQ.
Prior to the enactment of the Act of June 8, i88i, it
was the law of Pennsylvania that, as the essence of a mort-
gage is a conveyance of land as security for the payment of
a debt, a deed absolute in terms accompanied by a collateral
agreement for a loan of money by the grantee to the grantor
constituted in equity a mortgage ;' and that it could be
shown by parol that a deed, though in terms absolute, was,
in fact, a mortgage.'
' i3 State Trials, 72.
2 Friedley v. Hamilton, 17 S. & R., 70; Harper's Appeal, 64 Pa., 315.
3 Heister v. Madeira, 3 W. & S., 384; Umbenhower v. Miller, ior
Pa., 71.
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It was also, and it is yet, the law of Pentisylvania,
that although the recording statutes declare that no mort-
gage shall be sufficient to pass any estate unless recorded in
accordance with the statutes, nevertheless an unrecorded
mortgage is valid and enforceable as against the mortgagor
and his heirs and assigns, for the reasons as stated by Judge
SERGEANT,'that, while there is plausibility in the argument
that the strict terms of the statute ought to be enforced,
and that nothing should be allowed to dispense with the
actual recording of the instrument, yet when this doctrine
comes to be applied in practice it is found to be too strict
to be insisted upon as between the mortgagee and mort-
-gagor, for summumjus then proves to be summa injuria, and
the result of the strict construction would be to sanction
injustice and to reward the most palpable fraud and in-
iquity; and the courts, therefore, in the exercise of equity,
look to the object and design of the recording acts rather
than to their dry letter, and, therefore, hold that the re-
cording of a mortgage is unnecessary as between the niort-
gagor and the mortgagee.'
It was also, and it is yet, the law that although
the Statute of Frauds requires conveyances of land to be in
writing and signed by the parties, nevertheless a parol con-
tract for the sale of lands is enforceable as between the par-
ties where a court of equity finds the parties unequivocally
in a position different from that in which, according to
their legal rights, they would be if there were no contract;
3
and in such cases the defendant is charged, not upon the
contract, but upon the equities resulting from the acts done
in execution of the contract; for if. those equities were ex-
c luded, injustice not contemplated by the statute would be
done.'
It is, of course, unnecessary that I should quote any
authorities to establish the recognition by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania of the doctrine of part performance.
I Jaques v. Weeks, 7 Watts, 269.
2See also Tryon v. Munson, 72 Pa., 250; McLaughlin v. Ihmsen,
85 id., 364.
3 Dale v. Hamilton, 5 Hare, 381.,
SMaddison v. Alderson, 8 Appeal Cases, 467; per Selborne, L. C.
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Such being the state of the law, the Act of June 8,
x881,' was passed. That act is as follows :
"That no defeasance to any deed for real estate regu-
lar and absolute upon its face, made after the passage of
this act, shall have the effect of reducing it to a mortgage,
unless the said defeasance is made at the time the deed is
made and is in writing, signed, sealed, acknowledged and
delivered by the grantee in the deed to the grantor, and is
recorded in the office for the recording of deeds- and mort-
gages in the county wherein the said lands are situated,
within sixty days from the execution thereof; and stich
defeasances shall be recorded and indexed as mortgages by
the recorder."I
The Act of i88I seems to require the defeasance (i)
to be made at the time the deed is made; (2) to be in writ-
ing; (3) to be signed by the grantee or mortgagee ; (4) to
be sealed; (5) to be acknowledged; (6) to be delivered by
the grantee or mortgagee to the grantor or mortgagor ; (7)
to be recorded within sixty days from its execution, and (8)
to be indexed as a mortgage. Of these requirements the
second, third, fourth, and sixth would seem to be the. only
ones which can be of any possible .efficacy as between the
mortgagor and the mortgagee. The first, the contempora-
neous execution, would seem to be immaterial, if there be
a subsequent written admission by the mortgagee. The
fifth, the acknowledgment, is nothing more than a pre-
requisite to the recording; and the seventh, the recording,
and the eighth, the indexing, being only means of obtain-
ing actual notice, and, therefore, constituting in themselves
constructive notice, of the fact that the transaction is a
mortgage and not a sale, could be of no practical use to the
mortgagor, nor to a mortgagee, who having made a contract
intended honestly to perform it; while, on the other hand,
these requisites, if held to be essential to the legal validity
of the paper interziartes, might be used as a means of fraud
and as a trap to catch the unwary. The fourth requisite,
sealing, is worse than useless, for under Hacker's Appeal2 a
judge is permitted to recognize as a seal anything which he
1 P. L., 84. 2121 Pa., 192.
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chooses to regard as such. The second requisite, the writ-
ing, and the third, the signature of the party to be bound
thereby, are, of course, justifiable upon the reason which
supports the Statute of Frauds, and that is, that a written
admission is preferable to oral evidence, because the latter
may by mistake, or by fraud, misrepresent the transaction.
The Act of i88i, therefore, so far as regards its require-
ments of acknowledgment, recording, and indexing, would
seem to be nothing more than a recording statute, and as
such requiring the construction which has been uniformly
given to recording statutes ever since Levinz v. Will1
was decided; and so far as regards its requirements
of reduction to writing, and contemporaneous execution
by signing, sealing, and delivery by the mortgagee,
it would seem to be nothing more than a statute of frauds
and as such requiring.a construction in accordance with the
principles of equity.
It would seem also that the Legislature never could
have intended by the Act of i88i to make acknowledgment,
recording, or indexing an essential requisite to the legal
validity of the defeasance, as between the mortgagor and
mortgagee; for the object of indexing is to afford an easy
means of finding a record; the object of recording is to give
notice to parties who otherwise would not know of the ex-
istence of the instrument; and the object of acknowledg-
ment is to sufficiently attest a paper to permit it to be re-
corded; and of what possible use could either the indexing,
or the recording, or the acknowledgment, be to a mortgagee
who had executed the written defeasance, or toa mortgagor
who had received the paper from the mortgagee ?
In i888, the case of Sankey v. Hawley' came before
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The facts were
these: Samuel K. Sankey, being the owner of a lot of
ground and a planing-mill thereon erected, on December
17, 1883, borrowed from Hawley four thousand dollars,
and as security for the loan executed and delivered to
Hawley a deed in fee. Hawley contemporaneously exe-
cuted and delivered to Sankey the following written de-
feasance:
I Dall., 430. 2 118 Pa., 3o.
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" DUNCANNO.N-, Pa., December 17, 1883.
"This is to certify that S. K. Sankey and wife have this
day deeded me their property (see Deed Book Q., Vol. z,
page 634, etc., New Bloomfield, Pa.), for thepurpose of se-
curing the loan of four thousand dollars, and I hereby agree
to deed the above property back to S. K. Sankey, in fee
simple, with all the improvements thereon erected, upon
the payment of the four thousand dollars above referred to.
Redeemable within two years.
Witness, JOSEPH M. HAWLEW.
WILLIAM BOTHWELL."
Subsequently Samuel K. Sankey paid Hawley one
thousand dollars on account of the loan, and afterwards
conveyed the land to his father, Jacob Sankey, against
whom Hawley brought ejectment.
At the trial, the admission of the defeasance in evidence
was objected to because, although in writing, it had not been
acknowledged and recorded in accordance with the Act -of
88i, and the judge sustained the objection. The signa-
tures of Hawley and the subscribing witness were proved,
and no objection was made as to the absence of a seal.
After the facts as above stated had been proved by parol, a
verdict was directed for the plaintiff, and judgment on that
verdict was affirmed in the Supreme Court, Chief-Justice
GORDON delivering the opinion.
Thatjudgment in favorof the plaintiff allowed one who
had loaned four thousand dollars, and to whom one thou-
sand dollars had subsequently been repaid, to retain without
possibility of redemption the land which he had admitted
over his own signature to have been conveyed to him only
as security for his loan of four thousand dollars, although
one-fourth of the loan had been repaid, and although his ad-
mission was as a defeasance so far in strict accordance with
the requirements of the Act of i88i, that it was contem-
poraneous with the deed, that it was in writing, and that
it was delivered by the grantee and mortgagee to the gran-
tor and mortgagor, and that it was under seal; for as
no point was made as to its not beinglinder seal, and as
the report of the case is silent as to that, it must be taken to
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have been under seal. It, therefore, only fell short of a
full compliance with the Act of i88i in that it was not
acknowledged, recorded, nor indexed as a mortgage.
I venture to think, that the judge at the trial should
have directed, not a verdict for the plaintiff, but a condi-
tional verdict for the defendant on terms of repayment of
the balance of the loan with interest, on, the ground that
the defendant's title was in strict accordance with the Act
of i881 in so far as that Act could possibly apply as between
the mortgagor and the mortgagee.
The mistaken conclusion reached by the Court will
clearly appear, if it be observed that if Sankey's deed of
conveyance to Hawley had, like Hawley's written defea-
sance, remained unrecorded, Hawley could have recovered
in ejectment against Sankey upon the unrecorded deed as
an absolute conveyance, while he prevented the admission
in evidence of his own unrecorded contemporaneous defea-
sauce, which solemnly admitted over his own signature that
the transaction was a mortgage and not a sale.
In so deciding Sankey v. Hawley, a court of equity
.permitted an act of the Legislature to be used as a means
of effecting a fraud. I venture to think that in so doing
the Court violated established equitable principles.
The grounds of decision stated in the opinion are (i)
that the Act of i88i is plain and positive in its terms ; (2)
that it is, not a recording statute, and as such efficacious
only in favor of purchasers and encumbrancers, but that
it prescribes a rule of evidence which prevents a court of
"justice from permitting an absolute deed to be converted
into a mortgage otherwise than by all the evidence pre-
scribed in the Act; and (3) that the Act of 1881 would,
unless effect be given interfiartes to each and every of its
requirements, be nugatory and merely declarator, of the
existing law.
In reply to these reasons, it may be said: (i) the Act
of i881 is no more "plain and positive in its terms" than
are the recording statutes and the Statute of Frauds, and
yet the courts have consistently refused to enforce those
statutes inter Parles, whenever their enforcement would
work injustice.
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(2) The Act of I88i does not prescribhe a rule of
evidence of a more binding and stringent character than
that which the Statute of Frauds prescribes, and yet, as
Lord WESTEURY said in McCormick v. Grogan,1 "the Court
of Equity has from a very early period decided that even..
an act of Parliament shall not be used as an instrument of
fraud; and if in the machinery of perpetrating a fraud an
act of Parliament intervenes, the Court of Equity, it is
true, does not set aside the act of Parliament, but it fastens
on the individual who gets a title under that act and im-
poses upon him a personal obligation because he applies
the act as an instrument for accomplishing a fraud. . In
this way the Court of Equity has dealt with the Statute
of Frauds, and in this manner, also, it deals with the Sta-
tute of Wills."
Even if it were held that, by force of the Act of 1881,
the legal estate in fee vested in Hawley by Sankey's deed
could not be reduced to a mortgage, yet a court of equity
ought to have seen in Hawley's written defeasance, in San-
key's retention of possession after his conveyance, and in
his subsequent payment of one thousand dollars to Hawley,.
circumstance sufficient, notwithstanding the Act of 1881, to
constitute Hawley a trustee for Sankey as to the surplus in
value of the property over and above the balance of princi-
pal and interest due to Hawley on his loan. A court which
enforces the doctrine of part performance, and which, in
the exercise of equitable principles, reforms deeds, ought
not to have stopped short of that conclusion.
If the rule of evidence prescribed by the Act could be
regarded as of the stringent and binding character which
the Court attributes to it, it must follow that each one of
the eight requisites is of equally indispensable efficacy, and
it must also follow that a written and sealed contempora-
neous defeasance, acknowledged, delivered and recorded in
accordance with the Act, will be unavailing interiarles if
the Recorder's Clerk shall fail to index the mortgage; yet
Luch's Appeal, 2 which held fatal as against subsequent
purchasers a failure by the Recorder to record a mortgage
1 L. R-. 4, H. L., 97. 2 44 Pa., ST9
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in the proper book has been overruled by Glading v.
Frick,' and Paige v. Wheeler.2
(3) It is not an accurate statement to say that the
Act of 1881 would be merely declaratory of the existing
law, if its requirements as to acknowledgment, recording,
and indexing are not held to be applicable inter barles;
for, as has been pointed out, that statute is also a statute
of frauds in that it requires the defeasance to be in writing,
and signed by the mortagee, whereas prior to its enactment
no written defeasance was necessary interhartes.
It is also to be noted that the Act of 188i changesthe
law in another, and an important, respect. Prior to that
Act it was the law, that while a deed absolute in terms but
accompanied by a collateral agreement for a loan of money
by the grantee to the grantor constituted in equity a mort-
gage, yet a purchaser for value and without notice, taking
a deed from the original grantee, at any time subsequent
to the recording of the deed to that original grantee, took a
good title as against the original grantor." Under the Act
of x881, as the grantor and mortgagor has sixty days within
which to record the defeasance, it follows that until sixty
days from the date of any deed of conveyance shall have
passed, no one can purchase from the grantee therein with-
out encountering the risk of having his title defeated by
the recording of a defeasance and by its conversion of his
vendor's apparently absolute deed into a mortgage. If the
Act were, in any respect, judicious legislation, the clause
giving sixty days in which to record the defeasance would
yet be objectionable because it is inconsistent with the
policy of recent legislation, as evidenced by the Act of May
25 th, I878, 'which, probably, gives to purchase-money mort-
gages in Philadelphia a lien .only from the date of their
record, and because it opens the door to fraud.
188 Pa.,.46o. 292 Pa., 282.
8 Manufacturers' Bank v. the Bank of Pennsylvania, 7 W. & S.,
355; Jaques v. Weeks, 7 Watts, 261.
4 P.L., 1i.
